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Technology
Abstract. Motivated by online advertising auctions, we consider re-
peated Vickrey auctions where goods of unknown value are sold se-
quentially and bidders only learn (potentially noisy) information about
a good’s value once it is purchased. We adopt an online learning ap-
proach with bandit feedback to model this problem and derive bidding
strategies for two models: stochastic and adversarial. In the stochastic
model, the observed values of the goods are random variables centered
around the true value of the good. In this case, logarithmic regret is
achievable when competing against well behaved adversaries. In the
adversarial model, the goods need not be identical and we simply com-
pare our performance against that of the best fixed bid in hindsight.
We show that sublinear regret is also achievable in this case and prove
matching minimax lower bounds. To our knowledge, this is the first
complete set of strategies for bidders participating in auctions of this
type.
AMS 2000 subject classifications: Primary 62L05; secondary 62C20.
Key words and phrases: Second price auctions, Vickrey auctions, Re-
peated auctions, Bandit problems.
1. INTRODUCTION
Online advertising has been a driving force behind most of the recent work on online learning,
particularly in the realm of bandit problems. During the first quarter of 2015 alone, internet ad-
vertising generated $13.3 billion in revenue, according to the Internet Advertising Bureau. A large
fraction of advertising space is sold on platforms known as ad exchanges such as Google’s Dou-
bleClick and AppNexus, which facilitate transactions between the owner of advertising space and
advertisers. These transactions occur within a fraction of a second using auctions [Mut09], thus
placing the actors squarely within the framework of game-theoretic auctions with a single item
and multiple bidders. In this context, we refer to the advertising space as the good, its owner as
the seller and the advertisers as bidders, respectively. From the seller’s perspective, this is a well
understood problem in mechanism design: the Vickrey (a.k.a. second price) auction is optimal in
the sense that each bidder bidding their private value constitutes an equilibrium. Because of this
property, the Vickrey auction is said to be truthful.
∗Supported in part by NSF Graduate Research Fellowship DGE-1122374.
†Supported in part by NSF grants DMS-1317308 and CAREER-DMS-1053987.
‡Supported in part by ANR grant ANR-13-JS01-0004-01.
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2 WEED ET AL.
The seller may also maximize her revenue while maintaining truthfulness of the auction by
optimizing a reserve price below which no transaction occur. For example, when the bidders’ values
are drawn independently from known distributions, the optimal reserve price may be computed
in closed form [Mye81, RS81]. The independence assumption was questioned already by Myerson
[Mye81] and it was shown later [CM88] that when the assumption is violated, the seller can take
advantage of the situation to extract more revenue at the cost of a more complicated auction
mechanism. In particular, this mechanism allows bidders to be charged even if they do not win the
auction, which is arguably undesirable.
In short, the Vickrey auction is a reasonable compromise between simplicity and optimality, which
likely explains its prevalence on ad exchanges. Nevertheless, it suffers from a major limitation: it
relies on perfect knowledge of the bidders’ value distributions, which are unlikely to be known to the
seller in practice [Wil87]. This limitation has driven a recent line of work on approximately optimal
auctions [RTCY12, HR09, FHH13] that are robust to misspecification of these distributions. In
recent years the ubiquitous collection of data has presented new opportunities, insofar as unknown
quantities, such as the bidders’ value distributions or relevant functionals, may potentially be
learned from past observations. This new paradigm has been investigated in several recent papers:
[CBGM13,CHN14,FHHK14,OS11,CR14,ACD+15,KN14,DRY15,BMM15,MM14,ARS14]. One of
the take-home messages of this literature is that a few observations are sufficient to maximize the
seller’s revenue in the Vickrey auction. This not surprising since all that needs to be learned is the
reserve price.
Strikingly, all the aforementioned work adopts the seller’s perspective and focuses on designing
mechanisms to maximize the seller’s revenue. In this work, we take the perspective of a bidder en-
gaged in repeated Vickrey auctions. In the present paper, we identify and analyze several strategies
that can be employed by a bidder in order to maximize his reward while simultaneously learning
the value of a good sold repeatedly. This paradigm can be expressed as a learning problem with
partial feedback, or bandit problem [BCB12]. We are aware of only one other paper that takes
the bidder’s perspective [McA11] where using bandit strategies for bidding is suggested. Repeated
auctions have been studied in the bandit framework, primarily in the context of truthful ban-
dits [DK09,BKS10,BSS09]. However, this line of literature also takes the seller’s point of view and
aims at designing an auction mechanism rather than designing an optimal bidding strategy under
the constraint of a simple mechanism such as the Vickrey auction.
More generally, the problem we describe falls into the category of partial monitoring games, in
which the learner receives only limited feedback about the loss associated with a given action. By an-
alyzing the feedback structure of such games, it is possible to develop essentially optimal algorithms
for many games in this class [BFP+14]. However, the performance guarantees of these algorithms
degrade drastically as the number of actions increases. This renders these results unusable in our
context, where the bidder’s number of moves at each stage is essentially unbounded.
2. SEQUENTIAL VICKREY AUCTIONS
We restrict our attention to bounded values and bids in the interval [0, 1].
Let us first recall the mechanism of a Vickrey auction for a single good. Each bidder k ∈ [K+1] :=
{1, . . . ,K + 1} submits a written bid b[k] ∈ [0, 1]. The highest bidder k? ∈ argmaxk b[k] wins the
auction and pays the second highest bid m? = maxk 6=k? b[k]. In case of ties, the winner is chosen
uniformly at random among the highest bidders.
Each bidder k ∈ [K+1] has a private but unknown individual value v[k] ∈ [0, 1], which represents
the utility of the good. Note that this value is independent of the auction itself and is only measured
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by the bidder once the good is delivered to him. For example, in the case of advertising space, this
value may be measured by the expected profit generated from this ad or the probability that it
generates a click [McA11]. The reward of the winner is given by his net utility v[k?] −m?, while
the reward of a loosing bidder is 0.
Perhaps the most salient feature of the Vickrey auction is that it is optimal for bidder k to be
truthful, that is to bid b[k] = v[k] (assuming that the bidder knows this value). Here optimality is
understood in the equilibrium sense: any other bid b[k] 6= v[k], even random, could never lead to
a strict improvement in expected utility and might lead to a net loss for that bidder. An implicit
crucial assumption for the implementability of this bidding strategy is that each bidder must know
his own value, a hypothesis that is not necessarily met in online repeated auctions. Nevertheless,
a bidder may learn the value v[k] from past observations. Like bandit problems, this problem
exhibits an exploration-exploitation tradeoff: Higher bids increase the number of observations and
thus give the bidder a more accurate estimate of the value v[k] (exploration) while bids closer to
the best estimate of the value at time t are more likely to be optimal in the sense described above
(exploitation). We will see that auctions when viewed as bandit problems possess an idiosyncratic
information feedback structure: information is collected only for higher bids, but these should be
avoided due to the phenomenon known as the winner’s curse [Wil69].
We consider a set of T ≥ 2 goods t ∈ [T ] := {1, . . . , T} that are sold sequentially in a Vickrey
auction. Using a slight abuse of terminology, we will also call the auction at which good t is sold
auction t. We take the point of view of bidder 1, hereafter referred to as the bidder, and denote
respectively by vt, bt,mt ∈ [0, 1] the unknown private value of the bidder for the tth good, his bid
and the maximum bid of all other bidders for this good. Without loss of generality1, we assume
that bids are never equal. At time t ≥ 2, the bidder is aware of the outcomes of past auctions2
{(bs,ms), s ∈ [t− 1]} as well as a (potentially noisy) measurement of the values of goods [t− 1] at
times when the bidder won the auction. Our goal is to construct bidding strategies that mitigate
potential losses (overbidding) and opportunity cost (underbidding) for the bidder.
We consider two generating processes for the sequence of values {vt}t: stochastic and adversarial.
The stochastic setup is the most benign one: consecutive values {vt}t are independent and identically
distributed (i.i.d.) random variables in the unit interval [0, 1]. On the other side of the stationarity
spectrum is the adversarial setup, where the sequence {vt}t may be any sequence in [0, 1]. This
framework has become quite standard in the online learning literature [CBL06, BCB12] where a
game-theoretic setup prevails and arbitrary dependencies between rounds occur.
3. THE STOCHASTIC SETUP
Recall that consecutive values {vt}t are independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) random
variables in the unit interval [0, 1]. Let v = IE[vt] denote the common expected value of these random
variables. It is easy to see that the expected net utility of the bidder at time t, IE(vt−mt)1{bt > mt},
is maximized at bt ≡ v. Therefore, a constant bid equal to v is optimal among all sequences
of deterministic bids. This implies that the Vickrey auction is truthful in expectation. Since v is
unknown, the bidder may not be able to achieve the best net utility over t rounds, so his performance
1This can been achieved at an arbitrarily small cost by slightly perturbing original bids randomly.
2The bidder knows mt for auctions that he won since it is the paid price, and we assume that the winning bid mt
at times when he lost is made available publicly after each auction in order to incentivize higher future bids.
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is measured by his (cumulative) pseudo-regret3 R¯T defined by
(3.1) R¯T = max
b∈[0,1]
T∑
t=1
IE(vt −mt)1{b > mt} −
T∑
t=1
IE(vt −mt)1{bt > mt},
where the expectations are taken with respect to the randomness in vt and possibly in mt if the other
bidders are playing randomly. Regret and pseudo-regret as measures of performance are studied
primarily in the bandit literature but rarely in the context of auctions. Interestingly, using regret
as a measure of performance allows us to take opportunity cost into account. Indeed, a net utility
of zero can be obtained trivially at any round by bidding zero, but if the other bidders tend to bid
below the value of the good, the regret will still scale linearly in T .
Algorithm 1 UCBid
Input: b1 = 1, ω = 1, v¯ = v1,
for t = 2, . . . , T do
Bid bt = min
(
v +
√
3 log t
2ω
, 1
)
Observe mt
if bt > mt (win auction) then
Observe vt
v¯ ← (ωv¯ + vt)/(ω + 1) , ω ← ω + 1
end if
end for
We introduce a bidding strategy called UCBid be-
cause it is inspired by the UCB algorithm [LR85,
ACBF02] but tailored to the auction setup under in-
vestigation (See Algorithm 1). For the first auction, it
prescribes to place the bid b1 = 1 and thus win the auc-
tion. At auction t+ 1, t ≥ 1, this strategy prescribes to
place the bid bt+1 defined by
bt+1 = min
(
vωt +
√
3 log t
2ωt
, 1
)
,
where ωt is the number of auctions won up to stage t
and vωt =
∑ωt
s=1 vτs/ωt with τs being the stage of the
sth won auction. Interestingly, the UCBid strategy does not require the knowledge of past bids of
other bidders {m1, . . . ,mt−1}. This feature is particularly attractive in the setup of ad exchanges,
where the process takes place so fast that it may be useful for the platform to not communicate the
cost of an auction to bidders until the end of the day, for example. While the implementation of
the UCBid strategy does not require the knowledge of {mt}t, its performance is affected by other
bids that are larger but close to the optimal bid v. This is not surprising as such bids force the
bidder to overpay in order to collect information about the unknown v. However, sub-linear regret
of order
√
T is achievable regardless of the sequence {mt}t. We prove two results that show that
this strategy automatically adapts to more favorable sequences {mt}t.
3.1 Pseudo-regret bounds
Theorem 1. Consider the stochastic setup where the values v1, . . . , vT ∈ [0, 1] are independent
such that IE[vi] = v. For any sequence m1, . . . ,mT ∈ [0, 1] such that mt is independent of vt, the
UCBid strategy yields pseudo-regret bounded as follows:
R¯T ≤ 3 + 12 log T
∆
∧ 2
√
6T log T ,
where x ∧ y = min(x, y) and ∆ ∈ [0, 1] is the largest number such that no bid mt is the interval
(v, v + ∆).
3The benchmark in the (true) regret is the random bid that maximizes b 7→ ∑Tt=1(vt − mt)1{b > mt}. This
quantity is more difficulty to control and yields worse bounds, as detailed in Section 4.
LEARNING IN AUCTIONS 5
Proof. Since vt is independent of (mt, bt) and IE[vt] = v, we have
R¯T = max
b∈[0,1]
IE
T∑
t=1
(v −mt)1{b > mt} − IE
T∑
t=1
(v −mt)1{bt > mt}
= IE
T∑
t=1
(v −mt)1{v > mt} − IE
T∑
t=1
(v −mt)1{bt > mt}
where in the second equality we used the fact that the supremum is attained at b = v because
(v −mt)1{b > mt} ≤ (v −mt)+ = (v −mt)1{v > mt}, where x+ = max(x, 0).
Next, decomposing the regret on the the events {bt > mt} and {bt < mt}, on which the bidder
won and lost auction t respectively, we get
(v −mt)1{v > mt} ≤ (v −mt)1{v > mt > bt}+ (v −mt)+1{bt > mt} .
This yields
R¯T ≤ IE
T∑
t=1
(v −mt)+1{bt < v}+ IE
T∑
t=1
(mt − v)+1{v < mt < bt}
≤
T∑
t=1
IP{bt < v}+ IE
T∑
t=1
(mt − v)1{v < mt < bt} .
To control the first sum, using a union bound and Hoeffding’s inequality, we get
IP{bt < v} ≤
t∑
s=1
IP
{
v¯s − v < −
√
3 log t
2s
} ≤ t−2 .
so that
(3.2) R¯T ≤ pi
2
6
+ IE
T∑
t=1
(mt − v)1{v < mt < bt} .
Denote by ωt the value of ω during the tth round. To control the second sum in (3.2), observe
that, since bt > mt implies that the bidder won auction t, we have ωt+1 = ωt + 1. Denote by
W = {t ∈ [T ] : bt > mt} the set of auctions that the bidder has won. If mt ≥ v + ∆, we have
S := IE
T∑
t=1
(mt − v)1{v < mt < bt}
≤ IE
∑
t∈W
(mt − v)1I
{
∆ < mt − v < v¯ωt − v +
√
3 log t
2ωt
}
≤
T∑
t=1
∫ ∞
0
IP
{
v¯t +
√
3(log T )
2t
− v > u+ ∆}du .
Using Hoeffding’s inequality, we get
IP
{
v¯t − v >
√
3 log T
2t
+ u
} ≤ T−3e−u2/2 .
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It yields, on the one hand, that for any t ∈ [T ],∫ ∞
0
IP
{
v¯t +
√
3 log T
2t
− v > u+ ∆}du ≤√6 log T
t
+
∫ ∞
0
IP
{
v¯t − v >
√
3 log T
2t
+ u
}
du
≤
√
6 log T
t
+ T−3
√
pi
2
On the other hand, if t > t∆ := 6(log T )/∆
2, we have∫ ∞
0
IP
{
v¯t +
√
3 log T
2t
− v > u+ ∆}du ≤ ∫ ∞
0
IP
{
v¯t − v >
√
3 log T
2t
+ u
}
du ≤ T−3
√
pi
2
.
It yields
S ≤
t∆∧T∑
t=1
√
6 log T
t
+
√
pi
2
≤ 12 log T
∆
∧ 2
√
6T log T +
√
pi
2
.
Theorem 1 shows an interesting phenomenon: While UCB type strategies are usually very sen-
sitive to the assumption that the rewards are stochastic, this strategy is actually robust to any
sequence {mt}t that may be generated by other bidders, including malicious ones, as long as mt
is independent of the stochastic value vt for all t. Indeed, in this hybrid setup, where the vt’s are
random but the mt’s may not be, the UCBid strategy exhibits a sublinear regret that can even be
logarithmic in the favorable case where no bid mt is the interval (v, v+∆) for some ∆ > 0. It turns
out that this condition can be softened and can be well captured by a simple margin condition
under the assumption that the mt’s are also stochastic.
3.2 Margin condition
Assume in the rest of this section that m1, . . . ,mT
iid∼ µ for some unknown probability measure
µ. Borrowing terminology from binary classification [MT99,Tsy06], we define the margin condition
as follows.
Definition 1. A probability measure µ on [0, 1] satisfies the margin condition with parameter
α > 0 around v ∈ (0, 1) if there exists a constant Cµ > 0 such that
µ{(v, v + u]} ≤ Cµuα ∀ u > 0 .
The parameter α is an indication of the difficulty of the problem—the larger the α, the easier
the problem. Under the margin condition, we can interpolate between between the two bounds for
the regret—O(log T ) and O(
√
T log T )—that arise in Theorem 1.
Theorem 2. Fix T ≥ 2 and consider the stochastic setup where the values v1, . . . , vT ∈ [0, 1]
are independent such that IE[vi] = v. For any random sequence m1, . . . ,mT
iid∼ µ, where µ on [0, 1]
satisfies the margin condition with parameter α > 0 around v ∈ (0, 1), the UCBid strategy yields
pseudo-regret bounded as follows:
R¯T ≤
 c1T
1−α
2 log
1+α
2 (T ) if α < 1
c2 log
2(T ) if α = 1
c3 log(T ) if α > 1
where c1, c2 and c3 are positive constants that depend on α, v and Cµ.
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Proof. We will prove the following bound:
R¯T ≤

Cµ
(
12
1−αT
1−α
2 log
1+α
2 T + 1
)
if α < 1
6Cµ
(
log(T ) + 1
)2
if α = 1
6 log(T )
(
1 + 2
Cµ
α∧2−1
)
+
4Cµ
α∧2−1 + 1 if α > 1
Recall from the proof of Theorem 1 that
S := IE
T∑
t=1
(mt − v)1{v < mt < bt}
≤ IE
∑
t∈W
(mt − v)1I
{
0 < mt − v < v¯wt − v +
√
3 log t
2wt
}
≤ IE
∑
t∈W
(
v¯wt − v +
√
3 log T
2wt
)
1I
{
0 < mt − v < v¯wt − v +
√
3 log T
2wt
} ∧ 1
≤ IE
T∑
t=1
(
v¯t − v +
√
3 log T
2t
)
1I
{
0 < mt − v < v¯t − v +
√
3 log T
2t
} ∧ 1 ,
where we used the fact that bids always belong to [0, 1]. Using the margin condition, we get that
for α ≥ 0
S ≤ CµIE
T∑
t=1
(
v¯t − v +
√
3 log T
2t
)1+α
+
∧ 1 .
Hoeffding’s inequality yields that IP{v¯t − v ≥ ε} ≤ e−2tε2 , thus we get that
IE
(
v¯t − v +
√
3 log T
2t
)1+α
+
≤ (1 + α)
∫ ∞
−
√
3 log T
2t
(
ε+
√
3 log T
2t
)α
e−2tε
2
dε
≤ 1 + α
t
1+α
2
∫ ∞
−
√
3 log T
2
(
s+
√
3 log T
2
)α
e−2s
2
ds
≤
(6 log T
t
) 1+α
2
+
1 + α
2t
1+α
2
∫ ∞
√
6 log T
uαe−u
2/2du .
As a consequence, if α ≤ 1, we obtain
S ≤ Cµ
T∑
t=1
(6 log T
t
) 1+α
2
+
Cµ
T 2
.
and for α < 1, this yields that
S ≤ Cµ
( 12
1− αT
1−α
2 log
1+α
2 T + 1
)
,
while, for α = 1, we get
S ≤ 6Cµ
(
log(T ) + 1
)2
.
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When α ≤ 2, it holds that∫ ∞
√
6 log T
uαe−u
2/2du ≤
∫ ∞
√
6 log T
u2e−u
2/2du ≤ 2
hence
S ≤ 6 log T + 1 + Cµ
( T∑
t=d6 log T e+1
(6 log T
t
) 1+α
2
+
1 + α
t
1+α
2
)
≤ 6 log(T )
(
1 + 2
Cµ
α− 1
)
+
4Cµ
α− 1 + 1 .
For bigger values of α, we shall use the fact that if the margin condition is satisfied for α ≥ 2, then
it is also satisfied for the value α = 2. As a consequence, plugging the value α = 2 in the above
equation, we obtain that
S ≤ 6 log(T )
(
1 + 2Cµ
)
+ 4Cµ + 1 .
As we can see from Theorem 2, the margin parameter α allows us to interpolate between O(log T )
and O(
√
T ) regret bounds. Since UCBid does not require the knowledge of α, we say that it is
adaptive to the margin parameter α.
In fact, the above result holds, with the exact same proof, under a weaker assumption. Denote
by µt the law of mt conditional on the past history {bs, vs,ms}s≤t−1. Then the conclusions of
Theorem 6 remain true if all µt satisfy the margin condition with respect to the same parameters
α and Cµ.
3.3 Lower bound
We now show that the family of rates—indexed by α—is optimal up to logarithmic terms. As we
shall see the upper bound is tight already in the case where the bid {mt}t are i.i.d., independent
of {vt}.
We first consider the case where α ∈ (0, 1). For any α in this interval, let µα denote the distri-
bution on [0, 1] with density gα with respect to the Lebesgue measure, where gα is defined by
gα(x) = Cα
[(
x− 1
2
)α−1
1I
{
x ∈ (1/2, 1/2 + 2ε]}+ (x− 1
2
− 2ε)α−11I{x ∈ (1/2 + 2ε, 1]}] ,
where Cα is an appropriate normalizing constant. (In what follows, Cα > 0 is a constant that may
change from line to line but depends on α only.) See Figure 1 for a representation of this density.
Observe that µα satisfies the margin condition with parameter α > 0 around v.
For α ≥ 1, define the distribution µα to be the point mass at 1/2 + ε. This distribution also
satisfies the margin condition with parameter α.
Let ν denote the joint distribution of (vt,mt) and denote by R¯T (ν) the pseudo-regret associated
to a strategy when the expectation in (3.1) is taken with respect to ν.
Theorem 3. Fix α > 0. Let ν = Bern(1/2)⊗µα and ν ′ = Bern(1/2+2ε)⊗µα, where ε = 12T−1/2.
Then, for any strategy, it holds
R¯T (ν) ∨ R¯T (ν ′) ≥
{
CαT
1−α
2 if α < 1
Cα log T if α ≥ 1
LEARNING IN AUCTIONS 9
x
gα(x)
1
2
1
2
+ 2ε1
2
+ ε
Figure 1. Representation of the density g.95 of bids mt.
Proof. We first consider the case where α < 1. Recall from (3.1) that the pseudo-regret is given
by R¯T = IE
∑T
t=1 rt where rt denotes the instantaneous regret, defined by
rt(ν) = IEν(v −mt)1{v > mt} − IEν(v −mt)1{bt > mt} .
Note first that under ν or ν ′ we can restrict our attention to strategies that bid bt ≥ 1/2. Observe
first that since v = 1/2 under ν, the definition of the pseudo-regret (3.1) simplifies to
(3.3) R¯T (ν) =
T∑
t=1
IEν(mt − v)1I{bt > mt} = IEν
T∑
t=1
∫ bt
1/2
(x− 1/2)gα(x)dx
Moreover,∫ bt
1/2
(x− 1/2)gα(x)dx ≥ Cα
[
b¯α+1t 1I{b¯t ≤ 2ε}+
(
(2ε)α+1 + (b¯t − 2ε)α+1
)
1I{b¯t > 2ε}
]
where b¯t = bt − 1/2 ≥ 0. Therefore
R¯T (ν) ≥ CαIEνSα+1 ,
where
Sα =
T∑
t=1
b¯αt 1I{b¯t ≤ 2ε}+
(
(2ε)α + (b¯t − 2ε)α
)
1I{b¯t > 2ε} .
We will use the fact that IEνSα+1 ≥ (2ε)α+1S(ε) and IEνSα ≤ (2ε)αT + S(ε), where
S(ε) =
T∑
t=1
IPν{b¯t > 2ε} .
Next, for any strategy, define the associated test ψt ∈ {ν, ν ′} by ψ = ν if b¯t ≤ ε and ψ = ν ′ if
b¯t > ε. One the one hand, under ν, the instantaneous regret rt satisfies
rt(ν) ≥ IEν(mt − 1/2)1I{1/2 + ε > mt}1I{bt > 1/2 + ε} ≥ Cαεα+1IPν(ψt = ν ′) .
10 WEED ET AL.
On the other hand, under ν ′, the instantaneous regret rt satisfies
rt(ν
′) ≥ IEν′
[
1I{bt < 1/2 + ε}(1/2 + 2ε−mt)
(
1I{1/2 + 2ε > mt} − 1I{bt > mt}
)]
≥ IEν′
[
1I{bt < 1/2 + ε}(1/2− 2ε−mt)
(
1I{1/2 + 2ε > mt} − 1I{1/2 + ε > mt}
)]
= IEν′
[
1I{bt < 1/2 + ε}(1/2− 2ε−mt)1I{1/2 + ε ≤ mt < 1/2 + 2ε
]
= CαIPν′(ψt = ν)
∫ 2ε
ε
xα(2ε− x)dx ≥ CαIPν′(ψt = ν)εα+1
The last two displays yield
(3.4) rt(ν) + rt(ν
′) ≥ Cαεα+1
[
IPν(ψt = ν
′) + IPν′(ψt = ν)
]
.
It follows from Sanov’s inequality (see, e.g., [BPR13], Lemma 4) that
IPν(ψt = ν
′) + IPν′(ψt = ν) ≥ 1
2
exp
[− KL(ν⊗t, ν ′⊗t)] .
Moreover, since (i) mt has the same distribution under both ν and ν
′ and (ii), vt is observed only
when bt ≥ mt, we get
KL(ν⊗t, ν ′⊗t) = IEν
t∑
s=1
1I(bt ≥ mt)KL
(
Bern(1/2),Bern(1/2 + 2ε)
)
≤ 4ε2
t∑
s=1
IPν(mt ≤ bt)
≤ Cαε2IEνSα
≤ Cα(2ε)2+αT + ε2S(ε)
where we used the fact that ε ≤ (2√2)−1 in the first inequality. Together with (3.3) and (3.4), the
above two displays yield
R¯T (ν) + R¯T (ν
′) ≥ Cα
(
Tεα+1 exp
[− Cα((2ε)2+αT + ε2S(ε))]+ (2ε)α+1S(ε))
≥ Cα
(
Tεα+1 exp
[− ε2S(ε)]+ (2ε)α+1S(ε))
for ε such that (2ε)2+αT ≤ 1. We obtain
R¯T (ν) + R¯T (ν
′) ≥ Cα inf
S∈[0,T ]
{
Tεα+1 exp(−ε2S) + εα+1S}
The infimum is achieved when
S =
log(Tε2)
ε2
∨ 0 ,
so
R¯T (ν) + R¯T (ν
′) ≥ Cα
[(
εα−1 + εα−1 log(Tε2)
) ∨ Tεα+1]
for all ε ≤ 12T−1/(2+α). Since α < 1, we can choose ε = 12T−1/2, in which case
R¯T (ν) + R¯T (ν
′) ≥ CαT
1−α
2 ,
as desired.
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When α ≥ 1, we obtain the following analogue to (3.3):
R¯t(ν) =
T∑
t=1
IEνε1I{bt > 1/2 + ε} = εS′(ε)
where
S′(ε) =
T∑
t=1
IPν{bt > 1/2 + ε} .
The rest of the proof is the same apart from some small changes. Since vt is only observed when
bt ≥ 1/2 + ε, we obtain the bound
KL(ν⊗t, ν ′⊗t) ≤ Cαε2S′(ε) .
This yields
R¯T (ν) + R¯T (ν
′) ≥ Cα inf
S∈[0,T ]
{
Tε exp(−ε2S) + εS} .
The infimum is attained at the same value of S, which implies
R¯T (ν) + R¯T (ν
′) ≥ Cα
[(
1 + log(Tε2)
) ∨ Tε2]
for all ε < 1/4. Choosing ε = O(1) yields the claim.
4. THE ADVERSARIAL SETUP
In this section, unlike the stochastic case, we make no assumptions on the sequences {vt}t and
{mt}t, even allowing the seller and other bidders to coordinate their plays according to a non-
stationary process. As in the stochastic case, we compare the performance of a sequence {bt}t of
bids generated by a data-driven strategy to the best fixed bid in hindsight. As a consequence the
(cumulative) regret RT of the bidder for not knowing his own sequence of values is defined as
(4.5) RT = max
b∈[0,1]
T∑
t=1
(vt −mt)1{b > mt} −
T∑
t=1
(vt −mt)1{bt > mt} .
As in the stochastic case, we will also consider the pseudo-regret R¯T , defined in (3.1), which is
easier to handle and will serve as an an illustration of the techniques used in our proofs.
Clearly, R¯T ≤ IE[RT ] and it is well known that R¯T = IE[RT ] when the adversary is oblivious
[CBL06,BCB12], that is, when it generates its sequence of moves independently of the past actions
of the bidder. In the sequel, we study both oblivious and non-oblivious (a.k.a. adaptive) adversaries.
We henceforth consider a shifted version of the auction described above where the reward asso-
ciated to bid b at time t is given by
g(b, t) = (vt −mt)1{b > mt}+mt .
Shifting the reward of the game in this way does not affect the regret, but it has the convenient
effect that the bidder’s net utility at each round is positive.
For notational convenience, assume hereafter that mt ∈ (0, 1] and that vt ∈ [0, 1]. Precluding
mt = 0 has no effect on the problem if we replace mt = 0 by an arbitrarily small value.
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4.1 Oblivious adversaries
Algorithm 2 ExpTree
Input: η ∈ (0, 1/2), L = (0, 1], w(0,1] = 1, p(0,1] =
1 .
for t = 1, . . . , T do
Select ` ∈ L with probability p` and b ∼ Unif(`)
Bid bt =

1 with probability η
0 with probability η
b with probability 1− 2η
Observe mt ∈ ¯`= (x, y]
¯`
l = (x,mt], ¯`r = (mt, y]
w¯`
l
← w¯`, w¯`
r
← w¯`
L ← (L \ ¯`) ∪ ¯`l ∪ ¯`r
for ` ∈ L do
if bt > mt then
Observe vt
gˆ(`)← vt1I{mt`}
IPBt (bt>mt)
else
gˆ(`)← mt1{mt`}
1−IPBt (bt>mt)
end if
w` ← w` exp(ηgˆ(`)) , p` ← |`|w`,t∑
`∈L |`|w`
end for
end for
One popular strategy for adversarial partial-
information problems of this kind is the celebrated
Exp3 algorithm [ACBFS03]. However, Exp3 and
similar approaches are tailored to problems with a
fixed number of actions. In the auction setup, by con-
trast, the number of actions is a priori unbounded,
and even the number of actions up to equivalence
grows with T . Standard tools are therefore incapable
of achieving sublinear regret in this regime. In Algo-
rithm 2, we present a novel strategy for bandit games
of this type that allows the number of actions to grow
over time.
The algorithm maintains a sequence of nested par-
titions Lt, t ≥ 1 of (0, 1] into t intervals of the form
(x, y] for 0 ≤ x < y ≤ 1. We set L1 = (0, 1] and
the refinement of the partition Lt is done as follows.
Let ¯`= (x, y] ∈ Lt be the unique interval in Lt such
that mt ∈ ¯`. Then ¯` is split into two subintervals
¯`
l = (x,mt] and ¯`r = (mt, y]: Lt+1 = (Lt \ ¯`)∪ ¯`l∪¯`r.
This procedure is illustrated in Figure 2.
0 1
m4 m1
mt
m5 m9
Lt
0 1
m4 m5m1 mt m9
Lt+1
m1 mt mt m5
`
`l `r
Figure 2. Illustration of the splitting procedure for constructing Lt+1 from Lt
Each element ` ∈ Lt is assigned a probability p`,t defined in (4.8) below and such that p`,t > 0
and
∑
`∈Lt p`,t = 1. At round t, the ExpTree strategy prescribes to bid randomly as follows. With
constant probability, bid 0 or 1. Otherwise, first draw ` ∈ Lt with probability p`,t and then draw a
bid bt ∼ Unif(`) uniformly over the interval `. We denote the resulting distribution of bt by Bt and
by IPBt the associated probability. Note that Bt is a mixture of uniform distributions that can be
computed explicitly given p`,t, ` ∈ Lt:
(4.6) IPBt(A) = (1− 2η)
∑
`∈Lt
p`,t|A ∩ `| , ∀A ∈ (0, 1) mesurable,
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where here and in what follows, |A| denotes the Lebesgue measure of A ⊂ [0, 1]. It remains only
to specify the distribution p`,t, ` ∈ Lt. Intuitively, we hope to construct this distribution based on
the intervals’ past performance, but since the player only observes the value vt when bt > mt, we
cannot evaluate the gain g(b, t) of an arbitrary bid b at round t. Instead, we compute an unbiased
estimate gˆ(b, t) of g(b, t) given by
gˆ(b, t) =
vt1I{bt > mt}
IPBt(bt > mt)
1I{b > mt}+ mt1I{bt ≤ mt}
1− IPBt(bt > mt)
1I{b ≤ mt} .
It is not hard to check that IEbt∼Bt [gˆ(b, t)] = g(b, t). Moreover, this estimate is constant on each
interval ` ∈ Lt+1 and depends only on whether mt  ` (i.e., mt ≤ x for all x ∈ `) or mt  `.
As a result, overloading the notation, we define the following estimate for the gain of a bid in the
interval `:
(4.7) gˆ(`, t) =
vt1I{bt > mt}
IPBt(bt > mt)
1I{mt  `}+ mt1I{bt ≤ mt}
1− IPBt(bt > mt)
1I{mt  `} .
With this estimate, we can compute p`,t+1, ` ∈ Lt+1 using exponential weights:
(4.8) p`,t+1 =
|`|w`,t+1∑
κ∈Lt+1 |κ|wκ,t+1
, w`,t = exp
(
η
t−1∑
s=1
gˆ(`, s)
)
, ` ∈ Lt+1
for some tuning parameter η > 0 to be chosen carefully. The reweighing by the length |`| of the
interval ` in (4.8) is the main novelty of our algorithm.
Theorem 4. Let v1, . . . , vT ∈ [0, 1] and m1, . . . ,mT ∈ [0, 1] be arbitrary sequences. Let `◦ ∈ LT
denote the widest interval in the finest partition LT such that argmaxb∈[0,1]
∑T
t=1 IE(vt −mt)1{b >
mt} ∩ `◦ 6= ∅ and let ∆◦ = |`◦| denote its width. The strategy ExpTree run with parameter
η = (1/2)
√
log(1/∆◦)/T ∧ (1/2) achieves the pseudo-regret bound
(4.9) R¯T ≤ 4
√
T log(1/∆◦).
Proof. Any choice η ≤ 1/2 guarantees that the probability distribution Bt constructed above
is valid. Moreover, when
√
log(1/∆◦)/T > 1, the claimed bound is vacuous, so we can assume that
η = (1/2)
√
log(1/∆◦)/T .
Define Wt =
∑
κ∈Lt |κ|wκ,t. By extending the definition (4.8) of p`,t to all ` ∈ Lt+1, we can write
log
Wt+1
Wt
= log
∑
`∈Lt+1
|`|w`,t exp(ηgˆ(`, t))
Wt
= log
∑
`∈Lt+1
p`,t exp(ηgˆ(`, t)).
By construction, ηgˆ(`, t) ≤ 1. Since ex ≤ 1 + x+ x2 for x ≤ 1, this implies
log
Wt+1
Wt
≤ log
∑
`∈Lt+1
p`,t(1 + ηgˆ(`, t) + η
2gˆ(`, t)2)(4.10)
= log
(
1 + η
∑
`∈Lt+1
p`,tgˆ(`, t) + η
2
∑
`∈Lt+1
p`,tgˆ(`, t)
2
)
≤ η
∑
`∈Lt+1
p`,tgˆ(`, t) + η
2
∑
`∈Lt+1
p`,tgˆ(`, t)
2 .
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It follows from (4.6) that IPBt(bt ∈ `) = (1− 2η)p`,t for all ` ∈ Lt. Moreover, for `l, `r ∈ Lt+1 \ Lt,
there exists ` ∈ Lt such that ` = `l ∪ `r and
IPBt(bt ∈ `r) =
|`r|
|`| IPBt(bt ∈ `) = (1− 2η)p`r,t .
Of course, the same holds for `l so that IPBt(bt ∈ `) = (1 − 2η)p`,t for all ` ∈ Lt+1. Moreover, it
follows from (4.7) that∑
`∈Lt+1
IPBt(bt ∈ `)gˆ(`, t) =
∑
`∈Lt+1
mt`
IPBt(bt ∈ `)
IPBt(bt > mt)
vt1I(bt > mt) +
∑
`∈Lt+1
mt`
IPBt(bt ∈ `)
1− IPBt(bt > mt)
mt1I(bt ≤ mt)
≤ g(bt, t) .
Since g(bt, t) ≤ 1, we also have∑
`∈Lt+1
IPBt(bt ∈ `)gˆ(`, t)2 =
∑
`∈Lt+1
mt`
IPBt(bt ∈ `)
IPBt(bt > mt)
vt1I{bt > mt}gˆ(`, t)
+
∑
`∈Lt+1
mt`
IPBt(bt ∈ `)
1− IPBt(bt > mt)
mt1I{bt ≤ mt}gˆ(`, t)
≤ v
2
t 1I(bt > mt)
IPBt(bt > mt)
+
m2t 1I(bt ≤ mt)
IPBt(bt > mt)
= g(bt, t)gˆ(bt, t) ≤ gˆ(bt, t) .
These two inequalities yield respectively∑
`∈Lt+1
p`,tgˆ(`, t) =
1
1− 2η
∑
`∈Lt+1
IPBt(bt ∈ `)gˆ(`, t) ≤
1
1− 2ηg(bt, t) ,
and ∑
`∈Lt+1
p`,tgˆ(`, t)
2 =
1
1− 2η
∑
`∈Lt+1
IPBt(bt ∈ `)gˆ(`, t)2 ≤
1
1− 2η gˆ(bt, t) ,
Combining the above two displays with (4.10) yields
log
Wt+1
Wt
≤ η
1− 2ηg(bt, t) +
η2
1− 2η gˆ(bt, t) .
It follows from (4.7) that IE[gˆ(bt, t)] = vt +mt ≤ 2, hence
IE
[
log
Wt+1
Wt
] ≤ η
1− 2η IEg(bt, t) +
2η2
1− 2η .
Let G(b) =
∑T
t=1 gˆ(b, t) and G¯ =
∑T
t=1 g(bt, t). Summing on T , we obtain
IE
[
log
WT
W0
] ≤ η
1− 2η IEG¯+
2η2T
1− 2η .
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Let b◦ ∈ argmaxb∈[0,1]
∑T
t=1 IE(vt−mt)1{b > mt}, and suppose b◦ ∈ `◦ ∈ LT . We can bound WT
by writing
IE[logWT ] = IE
[
log
∑
`∈LT
|`| exp (η T∑
t=1
gˆ(`, t)
)] ≥ IE[ log |`◦| exp (η T∑
t=1
gˆ(b◦, t)
)]
= log ∆◦ + ηG(b◦).
Rearranging and noting that W0 = 1, we obtain
(1− 2η) max
b∈[0,1]
IEG(b)− IEG¯ ≤ 2ηT + (1− 2η) log(1/∆
◦)
η
≤ 2ηT + log(1/∆
◦)
η
.
Finally, since G(b) ≤ T , we obtain
R¯T ≤ 4ηT + log(1/∆
◦)
η
.
Plugging in the given value of η yields the claim.
Algorithm 3 ExpTree.P
Input: η ∈ (0, 1/8), γ ∈ (0, 1/4), β ∈ (0, 1), L = (0, 1], w(0,1] = 1,
p(0,1] = 1 .
for t = 1, . . . , T do
Select ` ∈ L with probability p` and b ∼ Unif(`)
Bid bt =

1 with probability γ
0 with probability γ
b with probability 1− 2γ
Observe mt ∈ ¯`= (x, y] and define ¯`l = (x,mt], ¯`r = (mt, y]
w¯`
l
← w¯`, w¯`
r
← w¯`
L ← (L \ ¯`) ∪ ¯`l ∪ ¯`r
for ` ∈ L do
if bt > mt then
Observe vt
g˜(`)← vt+β
IPBt (bt>mt)
1I{mt  `}+ β1−IPBt (bt>mt) 1I{mt  `}
else
g˜(`)← β
IPBt (bt>mt)
1I{mt  `}+ mt+β1−IPBt (bt>mt)1{mt  `}
end if
w` ← w` exp(ηg˜(`)) , p` ← |`|w`,t∑
`∈L |`|w`
end for
end for
Note that choosing a value of η
appears to require knowledge of ∆◦
and T in advance. However, the so-
called “generic doubling trick” allows
the bidder to learn these values adap-
tively at the price of a constant fac-
tor [HK10]. In the partial information
case, this change also requires replac-
ing ∆◦, the width of an interval con-
taining an optimal bid, by ∆, with
width of the narrowest interval.
We initialize two bounds, BT = 1
and B∆ = 1, and run ExpTree with
parameter η = (1/2)
√
B∆/BT ∧ 12
until either t ≤ BT or log 1/∆ ≤
B∆ fails to hold. When one of these
bounds is breached, we double the
bound and restart the algorithm,
maintaining the partition Lt but set-
ting w` = 1 for all ` ∈ Lt. This modi-
fied strategy yields the following the-
orem.
Theorem 5. The strategy ExpTree run with the above doubling procedure yields an expected
regret bound
RT ≤ 48
√
2T log(1/∆) .
Proof. Divide the algorithm into stages on which BT and B∆ are constant, and denote by B
?
T
and B?∆ the values of BT and B∆ when the algorithm terminates. The proof of Theorem 4 implies
that the expected regret incurred during any given stage is at most
4ηT +
log(1/∆)
η
≤ 4ηBT + B∆
η
≤ 4
√
T log(1/∆) .
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It remains to sum these regrets over each stage, since the actual expected regret (which requires a
fixed bid across all stages) can only be smaller.
Suppose that the algorithm lasted a total of `+m+ 1 stages, ` of which were ended because the
bound t ≤ BT was violated and m of which were ended because the bound log(1/∆) ≤ B∆ was
violated. The total regret across all `+m+ 1 stages is bounded by
∑`
i=0
m∑
j=0
4
√
2i · 2j = 4
(
√
2− 1)2 (2
(i+1)/2 − 1)(2(j+1)/2 − 1) ≤ 48√B∗TB?∆ .
Moreover, when the algorithm terminates, we have the bounds B?T ≤ T and B?∆ ≤ 2 log(1/∆). The
result follows.
4.2 Adaptive adversaries
Theorem 4 establishes an upper bound on the pseudo-regret against any adversary. Moreover,
when the adversary is oblivious, the same bound holds for the expected regret. When the adver-
sary is adaptive, however, achieving a bound on the expected regret requires a slightly modified
algorithm, Algorithm 3.
Algorithm 3 differs from Algorithm 2 chiefly in the method of calculating the estimated gain
in (4.7). In place of gˆ(`, t), ExpTree.P employs a biased estimate g˜(`, t) defined by
(4.11) g˜(`, t) =
vt1I{bt > mt}+ β
IPBt(b > mt)
1I{mt  `}+ mt1I{bt ≤ mt}+ β
1− IPBt(bt > mt)
1I{mt  `} .
The following theorem holds.
Theorem 6. Let v1, . . . , vT ∈ [0, 1] and m1, . . . ,mT ∈ [0, 1] be arbitrary sequences. Let `◦ ∈ LT
denote the narrowest interval in the finest partition LT and let ∆◦ = |`◦| denote its width. The
strategy ExpTree.P run with parameters
η =
√
log(1/∆◦)
8T
∧ 1
8
, γ = 2η, and β =
√
log T
2T
yields
RT ≤ 2
√
8T log(1/∆◦) + 3
√
2T log T log(1/δ) ,
with probability at least 1− δ. Moreover,
IE[RT ] ≤ 2
√
8T log(1/∆◦) + 3
√
2T log T .
Denote by G(b) =
∑T
t=1G(b, t) and G˜(b) =
∑T
t=1 g˜(b, t) the cumulative true and estimated gains
for a bet b. Before proving Theorem 6, we establish the following lemma, which shows that G˜ can
be viewed as an upper bound on G.
Lemma 1. With probability at least 1 − δ the bound G(b, T ) ≤ G˜(b, T ) + log Tδ−1β holds for all
b ∈ [0, 1].
Proof. Denote by IEt expectation with respect to the random choice of bt, conditioned on the
outcomes of rounds 1, . . . , t− 1. Fix b ∈ [0, 1] and define d(b, t) = g(b, t)− g˜(b, t). Note that
IEt[d(b, t)] = − β1I{b > mt}
IPBt(bt > mt)
− β1I{b ≤ mt}
1− IPBt(bt > mt)
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so that
(4.12)
d¯(b, t) := d(b, t)− IEt[d(b, t)] = vt1I{b > mt}
(
1− 1I{bt > mt}
IPBt(bt > mt)
)
+mt1I{b < mt}
(
1− 1I{bt < mt}
IPBt(bt < mt)
)
This immediately immediately yields d¯(b, t) ≤ g(b, t) ≤ 1. Since β ≤ 1, and ex ≤ 1 + x + x2 for
x ≤ 1, we have
IEt
[
eβd(b,t)
]
= eβIEt[d(b,t)]IEt
[
eβd¯(b,t)
] ≤ eβIEt[d(b,t)](1 + β2IEt[d¯ 2(b, t)]).
It follows from (4.12) that
IEt[d¯
2(b, t)] ≤ v
2
t
IPBt(bt > mt)
1I{b > mt}+ m
2
t
1− IPBt(bt > mt)
1I{b ≤ mt}
≤ 1
IPBt(bt > mt)
1I{b > mt}+ 1
1− IPBt(bt > mt)
1I{b ≤ mt}
= − 1
β
IEt[d(b, t)].
Combining this with the preceding inequality and the fact that βIEt[d(b, t)] ≤ 1 yields
IEt
[
eβd(b,t)
] ≤ eβIEt[d(b,t)](1− βIEt[d(b, t)]) ≤ 1.
Let Zt = exp(βd(b, t)). Then
IE
[
eβ(G(b)−G˜(b))
] ≤ IE[ exp (β T∑
t=1
d(b, t)
)]
= IE
[ T∏
t=1
Zt
] ≤ 1,
where the last step follows by conditioning on each stage in turn and applying the above bound.
To obtain a uniform bound, we note that the function b 7→ G(b)− G˜(b) takes at most T random
values G1, . . . , GT as b varies across [0, 1]. Moreover, we have just proved that maxj IE[exp(βGj)] ≤
1. Hence
IE
[
exp
(
β
[
max
b∈[0,1]
G(b)− G˜(b)])] = IE[ exp (βmax
j∈[T ]
Gj
)] ≤ T∑
j=1
IE
[
eβGj
] ≤ T.
Applying the Markov bound yields the claim.
We are now in a position to prove Theorem 6.
Proof of Theorem 6. We proceed as in the proof of Theorem 4. Note that the choice of η
guarantees that Bt is a valid probability distribution.
As above, define Wt =
∑
κ∈Lt |κ|wκ,t. We have
log
Wt+1
Wt
= log
∑
`∈Lt+1
|`|w`,t exp(ηg˜(`, t))
Wt
= log
∑
`∈Lt+1
p`,t exp(ηg˜(`, t)).
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Since ηg˜(`, t) ≤ η 1+βγ ≤ 1, the inequality ex ≤ 1 + x+ x2 for x ≤ 1 implies
log
Wt+1
Wt
≤ log
∑
`∈Lt+1
p`,t(1+ηg˜(`, t)+η
2g˜(`, t)2) = log
(
1+η
∑
`∈Lt+1
p`,tg˜(`, t)+η
2
∑
`∈Lt+1
p`,tg˜(`, t)
2
)
.
By the same reasoning as in the proof of Theorem 4, we have∑
`∈Lt+1
p`,tg˜(`, t) =
1
1− 2γ
∑
`∈Lt+1
IPBt(bt ∈ `)g˜(`, t) ≤
1
1− 2γ (g(bt, t) + 2β)
and similarly ∑
`∈Lt+1
p`,tg˜(`, t)
2 =
1
1− 2γ
∑
`∈Lt+1
IPBt(bt ∈ `)g˜(`, t)2.
To compute this last quantity, note that (4.11) implies∑
`∈Lt+1
IPBt(bt ∈ `)g˜(`, t)2 =
∑
`∈Lt+1
mt`
IPBt(bt ∈ `)
IPBt(bt > mt)
(vt1I{bt > mt}+ β)g˜(`, t)
+
∑
`∈Lt+1
mt`
IPBt(bt ∈ `)
1− IPBt(bt > mt)
(mt1I{bt ≤ mt}+ β)g˜(`, t)
≤ g(bt, t)g˜(bt, t) + β
(vt1I{bt > mt}+ β
IPBt(bt ∈ `)
+
mt1I{bt ≤ mt}+ β
1− IPBt(bt ∈ `)
)
= g(bt, t)g˜(bt, t) + β(g˜(1, t) + g˜(0, t))
≤ (1 + β)(g˜(1, t) + g˜(0, t)) .
where in the last inequality, we used the fact g(bt, t) ≤ 1 and g˜(bt, t) ≤ g˜(1, t) + g˜(0, t). Combining
the above bounds yields
log
Wt+1
Wt
≤ η
1− 2γ (g(bt, t) + 2β) +
η2
1− 2γ (1 + β)(g˜(1, t) + g˜(0, t)).
Defining G¯ =
∑T
t=1 g(bt, t) and summing on T yields
log
WT
W0
≤ η
1− 2γ G¯+
2Tηβ
1− 2γ +
η2
1− 2γ (1 + β)(G˜(1, T ) + G˜(0, t))
≤ η
1− 2γ G¯+
2Tηβ
1− 2γ +
2η2
1− 2γ (1 + β) maxb∈[0,1] G˜(b).
We bound WT by writing
logWT ≥ log ∆◦ + η max
b∈[0,1]
G˜(b).
Rearranging yields
(1− 2γ − 2η(1 + β)) max
b∈[0,1]
G˜(b)− G¯ ≤ 2Tβ + (1− 2γ) log(1/∆
◦)
η
≤ 2Tβ + log(1/∆
◦)
η
.
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Applying Lemma 1, with probability 1− δ we have
max
b∈[0,1]
G(b) ≤ max
b∈[0,1]
G˜(b) +
log(Tδ−1)
β
which implies
(1− 2γ − 2η(1 + β)) max
b∈[0,1]
G(b, T )− G¯ ≤ Tβ + log(Tδ
−1)
β
+
log(1/∆◦)
η
since 2γ + 2η(2 + β) ≤ 8η ≤ 1. We obtain
max
b∈[0,1]
G(b)− G¯ ≤ 2Tβ + log(Tδ
−1)
β
+
log(1/∆◦)
η
+ (2γ + 2η(1 + β))T
≤ 2Tβ + 8ηT + log(Tδ
−1)
β
+
log(1/∆◦)
η
.
Plugging in the given parameters then yields the claim.
The bound in expectation follows upon integrating the first result.
4.3 Lower bound
The dependence on ∆◦ in Theorem 6 is unfortunate, since the resulting bounds become vacuous
when ∆◦ is exponentially small. However, it turns out that this dependence is unavoidable. We
prove in this section a lower bound on the pseudo-regret R¯T . Since R¯T ≤ IERT , this bound will
also hold for expected regret.
We begin with a lemma establishing that the rate
√
T is optimal, using standard information
theoretic techniques for lower bounds (see, e.g., [Tsy09]).
Lemma 2. Fix an m ∈ [1/4, 3/4]. There exist a pair of adversaries U and L such that mt = m
for all t and the sequence v1, . . . , vT is i.i.d. conditional on the choice of adversary and such that
max
A∈{U,L}
max
b∈[0,1]
IEA
[ T∑
t=1
g(b, t)−
T∑
t=1
g(bt, t)
] ≥ 1
32
√
T .
Moreover, under adversary U any bet b > m is optimal, and under adversary L any bet b < m is
optimal.
Proof. We first consider deterministic strategies. Fix an ε. Denote by U the adversary under
which vt ∼ Bern(m+ ε) and by L the adversary under which vt ∼ Bern(m− ε).
Given a sequence of bids b1, . . . , bT , let T- and T+ be the number of times t for which bt < m and
bt > m, respectively. Denoting the regret after T rounds by RT , it is easy to show that
IEU [RT ] ≥ εIEU [T-]
IEL[RT ] ≥ εIEL[T-].
Write IPU and IPL for the law of T- under adversary U and L, respectively, and denote by IPav
the distribution of T- when vt ∼ Bern(m). Then Pinsker’s inequality implies
IEU [T-] ≥ IEav(T-)− T
√
KL(IPU , IPav)/2 , IEL[T+] ≥ IEav(T+)− T
√
KL(IPL, IPav)/2 .
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By the data processing inequality,
KL(IPU , IPav) ≤ T · KL(Bern(m+ ε),Bern(m)) ≤ T ε
2
m(1−m) ≤ 8Tε
2,
and likewise for KL(IPL, IPav). We therefore obtain
1
2
(
IEU [RT ] + IEL[RT ]
) ≥ ε(T
2
− 2Tε
√
T
)
.
Setting ε = 1
8
√
T
and bounding the average by a maximum yields
max
A∈{U,L}
max
b∈[0,1]
IEA
[ T∑
t=1
g(b, t)−
T∑
t=1
g(bt, t)
] ≥ √T
32
for any deterministic strategy. The claim follows for general strategies by averaging over the bidder’s
internal randomness and applying Fubini’s theorem.
We are now in a position to prove a tight minimax lower bound.
Theorem 7. For any strategy and any value of ∆◦ ∈ (0, 1/4), there exists sequences v1, . . . , vT ∈
[0, 1] and m1, . . . ,mT ∈ [0, 1] such that ∆◦ is the smallest positive gap between the adversary’s bids
and
max
b∈[0,1]
IE
T∑
t=1
g(b, t)− IE
T∑
t=1
g(bt, t) ≥ 1
32
√
T blog2(1/2∆◦)c.
Proof. We can assume without loss of generality that ∆ is a power of 2, since this can change
the regret by at most a constant.
Set n = log2(1/2∆). We divide the game into n stages of
T
n rounds each and will show that any
bidder incurs regret of at least 132
√
T
n during each stage by repeatedly applying Lemma 2.
During the first stage, apply Lemma 2 with m = 1/2. One of the two adversaries will incur
regret in expectation of at least 132
√
T
n . If that adversary is U , the next stage will use Lemma 2
with m = 5/8; if it is L, then the next stage will use m = 3/8.
In general, for the ith stage we will apply Lemma 2 with m = 1/4 + ci2
−i−1 for some ci. If
the U adversary has higher regret in expectation at that stage, then ci+1 = 2ci + 1; otherwise
ci+1 = 2ci−1. Note that during the ith stage, the smallest gap between two of the adversary’s bids
is 2−i−1.
The structure of the optimum bids for the adversaries U and L guarantees that during each
stage, there is an interval within which a fixed bid would be optimal for all previous stages. So after
n stages there is a fixed bid that is optimal for all n adversaries. Therefore the regret across the n
stages is equal to the sum of the regrets for each stage, and we obtain
max
b∈[0,1]
IE
T∑
t=1
g(b, t)− IE
T∑
t=1
g(bt, t) ≥ n 1
32
√
T
n
=
1
32
√
Tn =
1
32
√
T blog2(1/2∆)c,
as desired.
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5. CONCLUSION AND OPEN QUESTIONS
Building on established strategies for the bandit problem, we propose a first set of strategies
tailored to online learning in repeated auctions. Depending on the model, stochastic or adversarial,
we obtain several regret bounds ranging from O(log T ) to O(
√
T ) and exhibit a reasonable family
of models where regret bounds O˜(T β/2) are achievable for all β ∈ (0, 1).
In both setups, several questions are beyond the scope of this paper and are left open.
1. What is the effect of covariates on this problem? In practice, potentially relevant infor-
mation about the value of the good is available before bidding [MM14] and incorporating
such covariates can allow for a better model. This question falls into the realm of con-
textual bandits that has been studied both in the stochastic and the adversarial frame-
work [WKP03,KSST08,BCB12,PR13,Sli14].
2. In the adversarial case, our benchmark is the best fixed bid in hindsight. While this is rather
standard in the online learning literature, recent developments have allowed for more com-
plicated benchmarks, namely sophisticated but fixed strategies [HRS13]. Such developments
are available only for the full information case, however.
3. Our results indicate that when facing well behaved bidders, better regret bounds are achiev-
able in the stochastic case. Similar results are of interest in the adversarial case too [HK10,
RS13, FRS15]. Here too, unfortunately, existing results are limited to the full information
case.
4. The proof of Theorem 6 involves a union bound which leads to a O(
√
T log(T ) log(1/δ)) regret
upper bound. The result is a gap of order
√
log(T ) between the upper and lower bound. Is
this term really present?
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